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WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION
. AKHIL REED AMAR*
Here is a ten-minute historyl of women and the Constitution.
I. THE FOUNDING
In the 1780s, the United States Constitution was ordained and
established by men. As a rule, women did not participate in the
conventions that framed and ratified the Constitution. Women
did not vote for convention delegates. And women-as women-
did not publicly participate in constitutional debates in the press,
in pamphlets, and so on. To my knowledge, only one woman
played a prominent role: the Anti-Federalist Mercy Otis Warren,
sister of colonial lawyerJames Otis (who argued the famous 1761
writs of assistance case) and wife ofJames Warren, speaker of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. Mercy Otis Warren
wrote an important Anti-Federalist pamphlet in early 1788, but
she hardly did so as a woman. She published it under an un-
gendered pseudonym, "A Columbian Patriot," which most con-
temporaries attributed to a man, Elbridge Gerry.2 (Not until the
1930s did Mercy Otis Warren finally win authorial credit for thi~
pamphlet)3
n. THE ANTEBELLUM ERA
Early Nineteenth Century America carved life into separate
gendered spheres ofpublic and private. Men dominated "public"
fora-especially government-and women occupied key roles in
"private" domains, such as the family. Religion was initially seen
as a private domain where women could act And act they did,
associating with other women (and sometimes men) to pursue
moral reform projects that took on increasing public and polit-
ical significance as the century wore on-religious revivalism, the
temperance movement, anti-gambling campaigns, and eventu-
ally, the abolition and women's rights movements.
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School.
1. Okay, fifteen. (I ran over.)
2. See, e.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CoNSTITUTION, 1787-88 1 (Paul L Ford ed., 1888).
3. See Charles Warren, Elbridge Gerry, James Warren, Mercy Warren and the Ratification ofthe
Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, 64 MAss. HIsr. Soc'y PRoc. 143 (1932).
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Discourse on these matters featured women, speaking and
writing publicly as women-the Grimke sisters' and Harriet Mar-
tineau's public lectures against slavery, Harriet Beecher Stowe's
Uncle Tom's Cabin, and so on. This discourse was carried on not
only by women-as women-but also about women. Abolitionist
literature featured graphic accounts of the lives of slave girls and
slave women, as women. Slave women were breeders against their
will as women. They were forced to be wet nurses as women, and
sexual playthings as women. Anyone who studies abolitionist
literature will see these images over and over again: they are a
dominant theme ofmuch abolitionist literature. And men get it.4
Southerners punningly define slavery as a domestic institution.
Southern men don't like to use the word "slavery"-they prefer
the idea of "servitude." And indeed, they prefer the idea ofservi-
tude precisely to analogize the servitude of slave to master (or
should I say, of servant to master) to other sorts of servitudes that
characterize the domestic sphere-in particular, the servitude
that a woman owes to a man in marriage under the common law.
So much for the slave power defense, which understands some
of these connections. The Republican Party also understands
these gendered connections. The 1856 Republican platform de-
fines slavery and polygamy as "twin relics of barbarism."5 In a fa-
mous speech, Senator Charles Sumner makes a very similar
argument, and he's caned on the floor of the Senate for sug-
gesting that slave masters are sleeping with their slave women,
and indeed, that some of those slave masters are Senators-in
particular, Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina.6 The anal-
ogy to polygamy is thus quite literal. Republicans understand that
slavery is itself a form of polygamy that gives Southern white men
access-sexual access-to concubines, to slave women. And
white women in the South understand that, too. Mary Boykin
Chestnut has a biting line in her diary about how, like "the pa-
triarchs of old," Southern men are surrounded by their "concu-
4. See gener~ Neal K. Katyal, Note, Men Who Oum Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Cri-
tique ofForced ProstitutUm, 103 YALE LJ. 791, 796-805 (1993). See also Akhil Reed Arnar &
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105
HARv. L REv. 1359, 1365-72 (1992).
5. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1972 27 (Donald B.Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds.,
1973).
6. For details, see Arnar & Widawsky, supra note 4, at 1366 & n.22.
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bines," and the slave children "in every family partly resemble the
white children."7
So, the slavery experience should, I suggest, teach us that inti-
mate association between men and women does not in and of
itself guarantee respect and protection. (And here is where my
historical study of slavery leads me to differ somewhat from Pro-
fessor BeVier.)8 Slave masters intimately associated with slave wo-
men. They were the fathers ofslave women. They were the (half)
brothers of slave women. They were the sexual partners of slave
women. And sometimes they were more than one of these things
at the same time. They were having sex with their daughters and
their (half) sisters. And this was all very well understood in the
literature of abolitionism.
ill. THE RECONSTRUCTION
Women, in short, were in large part the agents and the sub-
jects of the Thirteenth Amendment. They were agents, because
women publicly mobilized for the Abolitionist movement; and
they were subjects, because half of the people who were emanci-
pated were female.
Now the Fourteenth Amendment comes along. Its first sen-
tence talks about all native-born peTIions being citizens-women
as well as men.9 The Amendment goes on to talk about "privi-
leges and immunities" of all citizens, and "equal protection" of
all persons.10 The central intellectual construct here is the dis-
tinction between civil and political rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment was understood to guarantee civil rights, but not
political rightsY
Political rights here are quintessentially the rights to vote, hold
office, serve on a jury, and serve in a militia. Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not about those things, and so, for
example, it's quite hard to see one-person-one-vote as supported
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ifyou believe in one-person-one-
vote and you're a textualist, you're much better off making an
7. MARY B. CHESTNUT, A DIARY FROM DIXIE 21-22 (Ben A. Williams ed., 1949), as quoted
in Amar & Widawsky, supra note ,4, at 1367 & n.23.
8. See Lillian BeVier, TMughts from a "Real" Woman, 18 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'y 457
(1995). .
9. U.S. CaNST. amend. XlV, § 1.
10. Id.
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ.
1193, 1260-62 & n.295 (1992).
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argument about the Republican Government Clause than about
the Fourteenth Amendment.I2
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was about "civil"
rights. Today when we talk about "civil rights," we often mean
voting. But during the Fourteenth Amendment era "civil" rights
meant such things as the right to own property, to contract, to
sue and be sued, to pursue a career, to inherit, to devise, to move
about freely, to speak freely, to assemble, to worship, and to be
able to invoke diversity jurisdiction-'rights which of course free
blacks like Dred Scott did not always enjoy, according to Chief
Justice Taney's infamous opinion.IS
Now, why did this distinction between civil and political rights
make any sense to the people at the time? Well, in part because
of the language ofArticle IV of the Constitution, which also talks
about "privileges" and "immunities" of "citizens". And the idea in
Article IV is, if you're from Massachusetts and you go down to
South Carolina, you have a right, equal to the South Carolinians,
to sue and be sued, to own real property, to make wilIs and all
the rest. But as a Massachusetts citizen you don't have a right to
vote in a South Carolina election, or serve in a South Carolina
legislature, or a South Carolina militia, or a South Carolina jury.
So that's one obvious example of how this distinction between
civil and political rights would have made sense to good lawyers
at the time.
But there is another model that they have in mind, consciously
or not. There is, in 1866, a longstanding category of citizens who
have rights as citizens-rights which Dred Scott lacked as a free
black-and yet who could not vote, hold office, serve in a militia,
or serve in a jury. They're called women-unmarried white wcr
men.I4 So another way ofputting the point is that the Fourteenth
Amendment, in some ways, was designed to give everyone-all
persons, all citizens-certain civil rights. These rights were
largely defined by the status of unmarried white women. The
Fourteenth Amendment was in effect saying that America would
let blacks-black men and black women-have the rights that
12. See generally Akhil Reed Arnar, The Central Meaning ofRepublican Government: Popular
SfJVereignty, Majority Rule, and the DerwminatoT Problem, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 749 (1994).
13. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. Once women married, they lost certain rights. Some of Professor Maltz's evidence
is really about married women; I don't think it carries over to all women. See Earl M.
Maltz, Sex Discrimination and the Original Understanding, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 415
(1995).
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unmarried white women had long enjoyed. So this is a central
intellectual category, defining in some ways, what the Fourteenth
Amendment was all about.
Now, a few textual points. The Fourteenth Amendment does
not mention race, in contrast to the Fifteenth Amendment. Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment does not, in its words at
least, treat race discrimination as different from gender discrimi-
nation. Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment does insert
for the first time the word "male" into the Constitution,15 and
women were outraged by this. They lobby against this in great
numbers.16 There .are petitions introduced in the 39th Congress
signed by hundreds and thousands of women mobilizing against
Section Two. But no one, none of the women, challenges Section
One. They think Section One protects them because it isn't lim-
ited to race-it protects all citizens, all persons.17
So, if we look first and foremost, as good constitutionalists, at
the text, and we look second not at narrow legislative history, but
at public understanding-what "We the People" reading the text
in 1866 would understand, especially reading the text in connec-
tion with other constitutional material, like the Dred Scott case, or
Article IV-I think we see a rather different picture from Earl
Maltz'S.lS A picture emerges in which women are in some ways at
the center of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let's take the 1873 Bradwell case involving Myra Bradwell's
challenge to an Illinois law that prevents women from practicing
law.19 The Bradwell case does not deny that the Fourteenth
Amendment covers gender discrimination; it just says that this
particular discrimination-implicating the "public" domain of
practicing law-is pennissible, and even there, the great aboli-
tionist and free soil lawyer, the ChiefJustice of the United States,
Salmon P. Chase, dissents. In a nutshell, I agree with an author
who wrote the following about Bradwell:
[C]ounsel for Mrs. Bradwell was no less than Senator Matthew
Carpenter, a leading member of both the Supreme Court's
bar and the Republican Party. He argued that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause forbade discrimination on the basis of sex
15. U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 2.
16. See generally Nina Morais, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost
History, 97 YALE LJ. 1153 (1988).
17. For more documentation and analysis, see id.
18. See Maltz, supra note 14.
19. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
o
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just as it forbade discrimination based on race. Carpenter's ar-
gument Erobably had merit, but this was a very hard
question. 0
The author? Some activist liberal academic, you say. A Justice
Brennan clone. (And I suppose it's suspicious that the quote ap-
pears in an article in the notoriously liberal Yale Law JournaL)
But we have the author here, today-my friendJohn Harrison of
the University of Virginia faculty, a Bork clerk, a self-described
originalist, and a old friend of the Federalist Society.21
Now a few words about the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fif-
teenth, unlike the Section One of Fourteenth, specifically ad-
dresses political rights. Unfortunately for women, it doesn't
protect women's political rights, but only the political rights of
black men-to vote, to hold office, to serve on juries. The Fif-
teenth Amendment explicitly talks only about voting, but what
does one do in a jury or in a legislature? One votes in a jury and
in a legislature. And so indeed, the famous case of Strauder v. West
Virginit?2 is best understood, not as a pure Fourteenth Amend-
ment case, but also as anticipating blacks' Fifteenth Amendment
right to equal political participation.23
Now women divide over the Fifteenth Amendment Remem-
ber, the women's rights movement had supported abolitionism
o in the Thirteenth Amendment, and freedom and equality in Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment; but now we have black
men being protected in political participation, but not women.
And the women's movement splits. Some support the Fifteenth
Amendment under the notion it's the black man's hour; others
oppose it24
20. Guess who. (No pee!qng.)
21. See John Hanison, Reconstnuting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE LJ.
1385, 1461 (1992).
22. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
23. That flaming judicial activist Lino Graglia has himself acknowledged as much in
the Stanford Law Review. See Lino A. Graglia, Interpreting the Constitution: Pomer on Bark, 44
STAN. L REv. 1019, 1042-43 (1992). For more evidence, see Akhil Reed Amar, The BiU of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1202·03 & n.313 (1991); and especially Vikram
D. Amar,Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1995).
24. See Sandra Rierson, 1 DUKE WOM. LJ. (forthcoming 1995); see alroJoEllen Lind,
Dominance andDemocracy: The Legacy ofWoman Suffragefor the VotingRight, 5 U.e.LA WOM.
LJ. 701 (1994).
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IV. THE SUFFRAGE REVOLUTION
Eventually, however, our Constitution restores symmetry be-
tween race and gender with the Nineteenth Amendment. And
the Nineteenth Amendment-born only after years ofhard labor
of a women's rights crusade led by women-is about women's
equality. It's about the right to vote, but not just for legislatures;
it's also about their right to vote injuries, and in legislatures.25
It's even about their equal military participation. In effect, if the
Fourteenth Amendment (although it doesn't use these words) is
about "civil" rather than "political" rights, the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth (though they also don't use these words) are about
"political rights"-the entirety of political rights, even military
participation. The Second Amendment basically says those who
are voters should be arms-bearers too. (Once blacks are allowed
to be voters, they participate in the military. Indeed, one of the
reasons they were allowed to vote in the first place, is that they
had fought in the Civil War. And Woodrow Wilson supports the
Nineteenth Amendment under the idea that women are eco-
nomic soldiers in the.fight against Germany in World War 1.26)
So, the Nineteenth Amendment, read narrowly, is about the
right to vote, but that right extends beyond voting for legislatures
to voting in juries, and to voting in legislatures. It also can be
understood as establishing a kind of a jartiori argument: if wo-
men have equal political rights, a jartiori they should have equal
civil rights. This is the view ofJustice Sutherland, in the famous
1923 Supreme Court case of Adkins v. Children's HOSpital.27 In ef-
fect, Sutherland, writing for the Court, says after the Nineteenth
Amendment is passed, America can't have paternalistic legisla-
tion for women's, but not men's, maximum hours and minimum
wages.28 Before the Nineteenth Amendment, maybe America
could have that kind of differential regulation, but not after-
wards. And he cites the Nineteenth Amendment for that
proposition.29
25. We could also see the latter as the right of women to be voted for. One way to
disenfranchise people is to limit their ability to vote for their first choice candidate, so to
preseIVe the right ofwomen to vote, we must preseIVe their right to vote for women, and
thus women's right to be voted for.
26. See Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 23, at 1164 n.152.
27. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
28. Id. at 553.
29. Id. In dissent,Justice Holmes harrumphed: "It will need more than the Nineteenth
Amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women, or
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The Nineteenth Amendment also works as a kind of estoppel
argument. Certain arguments about the difference between the
sexes that might have been constitutionally pennissible, as justify-
ing differential treatment before the Nineteenth Amendment,
are, as a matter of law, precluded by the affinnation of political
equality in the Nineteenth Amendment itself. And so it's stagger-
ing that it has taken the Supreme Court so long to see that the
Nineteenth Amendment really means that women must be equal
participants in jury service, which is, like voting, the way in which
first-class citizens exercise that citizenship.80 If women must be
equal for the ballot box, why not for the jury box too? Isn't gov-
ernment estopped from claiming that women and men are not
political equals? There's a case pending right now in the High
Court about peremptory challenges ofjurors on the basis of gen-
der, for which this Nineteenth Amendment vision is extremely
relevant.31
Thus, the Nineteenth Amendment can be understood as pro-
tecting more generally full rights of political participation. For
example, let's ask the question, "Can a woman be president to-
day?" Ifwe're narrow about it, we look at Article II, and find that
the Constitution says "he" over and over again to describe the
president. At the Founding, presidents are always analogized to
kings and never to queens-yet we know that the Founders had
experience with queens. (Virginia is named after one, William
and Mary is named after another.)
But however plausible that kind of Originalist argument might
be under the original Constitution, it makes no sense after the
Nineteenth Amendment. The Nineteenth Amendment is about
women's equal political participation, even though it doesn't ex-
plicitly modify the language of Article II.
that legislation cannot take those differences into account." Id. at 569-70 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) .
30. The Supreme Court did not explicitly recognize women's constitutional right to
jury equality until 1975-more than a half century after the Nineteenth Amendment be-
carne the supreme law of the land, in an opinion that nowhere mentioned that Amend-
ment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
31. SeeJ.E.B. v.Alabama ex. reIT.B.,114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Alas, this case, decided after
these remarks were delivered, represents yet another missed chance to develop a Nine-
teenth Amendment analysis. SeeJeffRosen, Oversexed, THE NEW REPUBuC, May 16, 1994, at
12.
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V. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Where does all this leave us today? I would argue as follows: if
the Nineteenth Amendment is fundamentally about women's
political participation-in voting booths, but also injuries and in
legislative assemblies-mere association with men in the civil do-
main, in the private domain, may not be enough, despite Profes-
sor BeVier's powerful points.
When women become half of those who vote in legislatures,
I'll probably join Professor BeVier.32
32. See BeVier, supra note 8. On political participation, I do think Professor Bevier very
usefully focuses us on some important distinctions. One, there is formal political partici-
pation in the vote. Two, there is participation in self-consciously understood public
speech in the political domain. And three, there is private speech influencing those who
do get to publicly speak and vote.
Women at the founding did not vote or enter the public square, or at least not as
women. During the Reconstruction era they did not vote, but they did enter the public
square. It is very interesting, for example, that in the 1860s, the Senate refused to hear the
petition of any alien, because the Constitution speaks of the right of the people to peti-
tion, but aliens were not understood to be part of "We the People." The Senate simply
refused to hear their petitions. See Amar, supra note 10, at 1226, 1282-83. Yet women
could, and did, petition because even though they were not voters, they were understood
as part of "We the People." So, here we see the second category, second-class citizenship,
as it were.
You might think that what is most important is the ability simply to influence, through
daily association, those who do vote and participate in the pUblic square. And Professor
BeVier made a very nice case for that. That approach once resonated with me, influenced
as I was by Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I once-thought that all that
was necessary was to get different groups to mingle together daily-blacks and whites, at
least 40 years ago, did not typically live in the same neighborhood, did not work in the
same workplaces, and did not worship in the same churches. (Sunday at 10 a.m. is still
one of the most segregated hours in America.) And so I thought that ifwe just brought
them closer together, that would create ties of connection and virtual representation. My
study ofslavery has suggested it isn't quite so simple as that. Remember, slavery involved
very intimate, cheek by jowl association-of blacks and whites and of men and women.
And so slavery's lesson for me is that unless the participation or the association is charac-
terized by certain conditions of equality and mutual respect, it might actually contribute
to, rather than eliminate, the plight of the undercaste. So, Brown, in my new understand-
ing, was very important, because it was about creating an intimate association in institu-
tions where there would be concern and respect-in schools, in universities- and that is why I
now talk about equal participation in juries and in legislatures.
Yet when I look around today, I see women under-represented in legislatures-and
here I do not mean women of a certain kind. I mean women of all political persuasions,
all ideologies, all views. I would love it if I saw Lillian BeVier-one day on a bench or in the
legislature.
But what are the conditions that have impeded women's equality in legislatures? Con-
sider first women's historic lack of control over reproduction-the story ofAnita Allen's
mother, for example. See Anita AlIen, The Praposed Equal Protection FIX for Abortion Law:
Rejlettions on Citizenship. Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARv. ].L. & PuB. POL'Y 419
(1995). Much of the progress that has been made by women in the last two hundred
years, or indeed over the last two thousand years, has been created not by law but by
technology, and in particular, reproductive technology that has made childbearing and
childbirth less deadly and contraception easier. These have had a dramatic impact on
women's ability to control their reproduction, and therefore their lives. Only after some
of those changes did it make economic sense to invest in women's higher education. Ifa
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woman was going to have eight kids, and might well die before menopause, it did not
make sense as an economic investment to send her to college or to groom her for the
Senate.
A couple of final points about how the under-representation of women in legislatures
in particular, and political office more generally, is not merely the product of individual
choices, but structural in nature. First, I will pander to the crowd. Term limits might be a
good thing-we would have more rotation. You all should like it, because most ofyou are
Republicans, and most of the legislators are Democrats. [Note: These remarks were deliv-
ered before the November 1994 elections.] And it's not quite a free election, because
every time you vote against an incumbent your district loses competitive seniority, and
therefore pork, vi&-a-vis other districts. So, we've got a built-in prisoner's dilemma struc-
ture that is conducive to re-election. Women, interestingly, are having much better results
oflate running for open seats, than when they have to challenge incumbents. And right
now we've got a lot of men who are incumbents. Now that in some ways just pushes the
question 20 years back or 30 years back, because there were open seats after the Nine-
teenth Amendment. But there have always been other structural impediments to women's
equal participation in government.
We have today, and have always had, legal discrimination in the military. That discrimi-
nation differentially advantages men in political office. Men can present themselves as
having served the Republic, knowing what they are talking about when they talk about
military policy, whereas Patricia Schroeder is told to shut up because she has not been
there. People who serve their country militarily are far more credentialed in the political
domain, and always have been. When you get out of the military, you get veteran's prefer-
ences-and not simply pensions and money, but actually preferences for holding offices
like administrative lawjudgeships, which is why over 90% of the administrative lawjudges
are men: because there's a veteran's preference that is absolutely gendered.
Fmally, let's talk about the economy more generally. The great differential in wages
between men and women is actually not between unmarried men and unmarried women,
That differential has almost been eliminated. The big gap is between married men and
married women, and this is not merely a function of individual choices, but our tax code.
And differential economic power can translate into differential political power. So ine-
quality of representation in legislatures is not merely the result of individual choice, but
of laws-discriminatory laws.
